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International Sale of Goods
By Gregory M. Duhl*

INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín v. Texas1 raised questions
about the effect of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (“CISG”)2 in the United States. An international treaty,
such as the CISG, is only enforceable in U.S. courts as domestic law if it is
self-executing or ratified by Congress.3 Congress never ratified the CISG, so it
is enforceable as domestic law only if it is self-executing. In Medellín, the Court
held that in order to be self-executing, a treaty must “itself convey[] an intention that it be ‘self-executing.’ ”4 The Court stated that this does not require that
the “treaty provide for self-execution in so many talismanic words,”5 but rather
requires “courts to decide whether a treaty’s terms reflect a determination by
the President who negotiated it and the Senate that confirmed it that the treaty
has domestic effect.”6 While it is likely the CISG was self-executing,7 Medellín
raises at least a lingering question of whether the CISG is enforeceable as a matter of domestic law.8
Putting that question aside, in 2008, U.S. courts interpreted the scope, formation, modification, excuse, notice, and remedies provisions of the CISG. The critical decisions and their relevance are discussed below.

* Associate Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. I thank Emily Babcock and Eric
Elzen for their research assistance with this Survey.
1. 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
2. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980,
1489 U.N.T.S. 3, 19 I.L.M. 671, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/treaty.html [hereinafter CISG].
3. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1351.
4. Id. at 1356.
5. Id. at 1366.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1027 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting the
CISG is a self-executing treaty).
8. See Posting of Jeremy Tallman to Contracts Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/con
tractsprof_blog/2008/03/medellín-and-th.html (Mar. 28, 2008, 05:57 EST) (“Medellín and the CISG”);
see also Mark Cantora, The CISG After Medellín v. Texas: Do U.S. Businesses Have It? Do They Want It?,
8 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 111, 113–20 (2009) (discussing whether the CISG is self-executing after Medellín).
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SCOPE
In Novelis Corp. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,9 the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio found that the CISG did not apply where the seller’s predecessor
(the original party to the contract) and the buyer both had places of business in
the United States at the time the contract was formed. For purposes of determining whether the CISG is applicable to a contract, a critical factor is where a party
has its place of business at the time of contract formation, not at the time of the
dispute. In Novelis, the court found that, despite references to the seller’s predecessor as a Canadian company, it was a Texas corporation and therefore the CISG
did not apply.10
In Sky Cast, Inc. v. Global Direct Distribution, LLC,11 the court recognized that a
claim of negligent misrepresentation must be decided under state law because negligent misrepresentation is outside the scope of the CISG. According to the court:
[N]egligent misrepresentation is a tort claim completely different from a claim for
breach of contract. Being a tort claim, the court concludes that it is not controlled
by the CISG, which only concerns the sales of goods between merchants in different
countries, and that since this action is a diversity action, Global’s claim for negligent
misrepresentation is controlled by state law.12

In Valeo Sistemas Electricos S.A. de C.V. v. CIF Licensing, LLC,13 the U.S. District
Court for the District of Delaware addressed the issue of what happens if application of the CISG is uncertain when ruling on a motion to dismiss. Valeo arose
out of a dispute between a Mexican company, Valeo C.V., and a U.S. company,
Stmicroelectronics, Inc. (“STM”). Valeo C.V. alleged that STM was required to
indemnify it in a patent infringement suit. The parties’ contract contained four
provisions that could possibly have governed the indemnification issue (one of
which was the default provisions of the CISG).14 Which provision applied was a
question of contract interpretation that the court could not resolve on a motion
to dismiss.15 Therefore, the court found that as long as Valeo C.V. could allege its
claim under at least one of the four possible provisions, it would deny STM’s motion to dismiss.16 The court ultimately held that Valeo was able to allege its claim
under Valeo’s General Terms so it denied the motion to dismiss.17

9. 559 F. Supp. 2d 877, 882 n.4 (N.D. Ohio 2008).
10. See id. The parties in this case agreed that New York law applied, so even if Novelis was found to
have been a Canadian corporation, the CISG still would not have applied because the parties decided
to opt out pursuant to article 6. See id. at 882. See also CISG, supra note 2, art. 6 (permiting parties to
“exclude application of this Convention”).
11. No. 07-161-JBT, 2008 WL 754734, at *1, *6–11 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 18, 2008).
12. Id. at *7. The court went on to deny Global’s motion for summary judgment on the misrepresentation issue, finding the facts did not support its claim. Id. at *7–9.
13. No. 06-627-GMS-LPS, 2008 WL 2736819, at *4 (D. Del. July 18, 2008).
14. Id. The four provisions were “(1) Valeo’s General Terms; (ii) STM’s Terms and Conditions of
Sale; (iii) the default contractual provisions of the [U.C.C.]; and/or (iv) the default provisions of the
[CISG].” Id.
15. See id. at *4.
16. Id. at *4–6.
17. Id.
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FORMATION AND RESERVATION UNDER THE CISG
In Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Power Source Supply, Inc.,18 the court had to decide
if the purchase order or bills of sale were the operative version of a contract for
the sale of locomotives. Because the bills of sale materially altered the terms of the
purchase order, the bills of sale, when executed by the parties, became their final
agreement under CISG article 19.19
On February 9, 2008, the plaintiff, Power Source, a Canadian corporation with
its principal place of business in Canada, faxed the defendant, Norfolk, a U.S.
company, a final purchase order. The locomotives were delivered and the defendant executed the plaintiff’s bills of sale on February 14, 2008. The bills of
sale contained disclaimers of implied warranties, which the purchase order did
not. The court found that CISG article 19 applied, and found that because the
disclaimer in the bills of sale related to both the quality of the goods and Norfolk’s liability to Power Source, the bills of sale materially altered the terms of the
purchase order and therefore constituted a counteroffer by Norfolk that Power
Source accepted by its execution of the bills of sale.20 Therefore, the final agreement included no implied warranties.21
Further, under article 74, the court awarded the plaintiff the outstanding
$784,315 balance on the contract, and noted that Norfolk could not collect attorney’s fees under article 75 or any other article of the CISG.22
The court then had to calculate prejudgment interest. According to the court,
Article 78 entitled Norfolk to prejudgment interest, but the CISG does not specify how that rate is to be determined.23 Because the dispute was a federal question, the court calculated the interest rate pursuant to federal statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1961(a),24 under which interest accrues at a rate equal to the weekly average
one-year constant maturity Treasury yield.25
Key Safety Systems, Inc. v. Invista, S.A.R.L., L.L.C.26 provides a good illustration
of circularity between the battle-of-the-forms provisions in the CISG and the
18. No. 06-58 J, 2008 WL 2884102, at *6–7 (W.D. Pa. July 25, 2008).
19. See id. at *7. See also CISG, supra note 2, art. 19 (providing reply to offer constitutes counteroffer if reply contains additions, limitations, or other modifications that materially alter terms of offer
and terms relating to quality of goods and extent of party’s liability materially alter terms of offer).
20. Norfolk S., 2008 WL 2884102, at *6–7.
21. Id. at *7. Although the CISG does not specifically include the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, article 35 can be read to suggest that such warranties exist.
See id. at *5. Article 35 also allows for their disclaimer, which is what the parties did in this case. See
id. Although article 35 permits disclaimer by agreement, it does not provide the standard by which the
validity of the disclaimer should be judged. See CISG, supra note 2, art. 4(a) (providing that the CISG
does not address the validity of contract provisions). The court turned to the law of Alberta, Canada
(the relevant province) and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (the relevant U.S. state) to determine
the disclaimer’s validity. Finding that the provision was conspicuous and mentioned “merchantability”
so as to satisfy the U.C.C. as applicable in Pennsylvania and indicated express agreement as required
by Alberta law, the disclaimer was effective regardless of whether Pennsylvania or Alberta law governed. See Norfolk S., 2008 WL 2884102, at *5–6.
22. Norfolk S., 2008 WL 2884102, at *7.
23. See id. See also infra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (2006).
25. Norfolk S., 2008 WL 2884102, at *8.
26. No. 08-CV-10558, 2008 WL 4279358 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 16, 2008).
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Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). The case arose out of a contract dispute
between Key Safety Systems, Inc. (“KSS”), a Delaware corporation, and Invista,
a Luxembourg corporation. KSS claimed there was a requirements contract between it and Invista for the supply of specially manufactured yarn. Although no
written contract was ever signed, KSS alleged the contract provided for acceptance by performance. KSS claimed Invista agreed to the contract when it shipped
the yarn. Invista, on the other hand, argued that it never accepted the requirements contract, and that it made a counteroffer each time it shipped the yarn
with terms and conditions, which KSS agreed to when it accepted the yarn. The
sole question before the court was whether it should grant injunctive relief to
KSS while the issue of whether there was a requirements contract was litigated.
The court ultimately granted the injunction in part and denied it in part, holding
that Invista would have to continue to supply yarn, but KSS would have to pay
Invista’s last quoted price.27
What is interesting about this case (in relation to the CISG) is Invista’s secondary argument, which was that if its counteroffers were not valid (and the requirements contract was formed when it shipped the yarn), then the choice-of-law
provision in its Terms and Conditions opting out of the CISG would likewise not
be valid under U.C.C. section 2-207(3).28 By default, the CISG would control
and, under the CISG, formation of a requirements contract might not have been
possible in this case.29 If the parties did not have a requirements contract, the fact
that Invista’s terms materially altered the terms of KSS’s purchase order would
make Invista’s terms control under CISG article 19,30 and Invista opted out of the
CISG. The U.C.C. would apply. The reasoning is circular. The court never addressed this issue, but it is worth highlighting.
In Forestal Guarani, S.A. v. Daros International, Inc.,31 the court asked the parties
to brief the relevance and application of the CISG to their dispute and ultimately
held that the seller could not show that a contract existed because of Argentina’s
reservation to the CISG, which necessitates that all contracts governed by the CISG
be in writing where one of the parties has its place of business in Argentina.
The case involves an Argentinean corporation, Forestal Guarani (“Forestal”), and
a New Jersey corporation, Daros International (“Daros”). Daros is an import-export
corporation, and Forestal manufactures lumber products, including wooden finger joints. Around 1999, the parties entered into a verbal agreement under which
Daros agreed to sell Forestal’s finger joints to various third-party purchasers in the
United States. When a dispute arose as to part of the purchase price that the seller
alleged it did not receive, the court directed the parties to submit a supplemental
briefing addressing five points of law regarding the CISG:

27. Key Safety Sys., 2008 WL 4279358, at *13–14.
28. See U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (2002).
29. See Key Safety Sys., 2008 WL 4279358, at *9 n.2. The court never actually reached the issue of
whether the CISG would bar a requirements contract. See id.
30. See CISG, supra note 2, art. 19.
31. No. 03-4821 ( JAG), 2008 WL 4560701, at *1–2, *5 (D.N.J. Oct. 8, 2008).
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(1) Does the [CISG] govern this dispute?; (2) Are any of the exceptions contained
in the CISG applicable to the instant action?; (3) What effect does the application of
the CISG Treaty have on this dispute?; (4) Does the Treaty preempt State law causes
of action?; and (5) Does the CISG provide the exclusive remedy to Forestal in this
dispute?32

If a non-consumer contract is silent as to choice of law, the CISG applies to the
agreement if the parties have places of business in different signatory states.33 The
court noted that article 11 of the CISG provides that parties to contracts governed
by the CISG are not required to memorialize their agreements in writing and may
enforce oral contracts.34 However, CISG article 12 allows the signatories to the
CISG to opt out of article 11 and require written contracts.35 Argentina chose to
exercise its reservation option pursuant to article 96, and therefore, under the
CISG as ratified by Argentina, a contract must be in writing to be enforceable.36
The court found that where only one party is from a state that has made an article 96 reservation to article 11, the contract must be in writing.37 The court must
respect the policy of that member state not to bind its citizens to oral contracts
with citizens of other member states despite the goal of the CISG to facilitate international commerce.38 Because the plaintiff did not allege that there was a written
contract between the parties, and there was no written evidence of any contract,
the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim failed.39
The same issue arose in Zhejiang Shaoxing Yongli Printing & Dyeing Co., Ltd. v.
Microflock Textile Group Corp.40 The parties had an ongoing business relationship
between 2002 and 2004. The plaintiff, a Chinese company, filed an action against
the defendant, a U.S. company, for failing to make full payment on goods delivered and accepted. There were eight separate orders and shipments and therefore
eight contracts; for each one, the defendant sent a purchase order and the plaintiff
accepted the order when it sent the plaintiff a packing list and invoice with the
filled order. The defendant argued that its obligation to pay the plaintiff the total
amount due on the eight invoices was modified.
However, because the defendant produced no evidence of a written modification, the court denied its claim.41 China has made a declaration under article 96
requiring contracts to be in writing, just as Argentina has.42 Because one contracting party was from China, the court would not consider whether there was a
modification without a writing.43
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at *1–2.
See id. at *3.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at *4. See also infra note 43 and accompanying text.
Forestal Guarani, 2008 WL 4560701, at *4.
See id.
No. 06-22608, 2008 WL 2098062, at *3 (S.D. Fla. May 19, 2008).
See id. at *5.
See id. at *3. See also supra note 36 and accompanying text.
See Zhejiang Shaoxing, 2008 WL 2098062, at *4–5.
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MODIFICATION
Two CISG cases in 2008 required courts to consider whether a forum selection clause in a seller’s terms of sale was a modification to a contract, with the
courts coming out differently but agreeing that the critical factor was whether
the buyer agreed to the modification. In Solae, LLC v. Hershey Canada, Inc.,44 the
seller’s terms of sale did not modify a contract between the parties because the
buyer did not assent to the terms.
For several years, Solae, LLC (“Solae”), had supplied soy lecithin to Hershey
Canada, Inc. (“Hershey”), a Canadian corporation. In late 2005, Solae and Hershey negotiated a contract for 2006. The parties did not mention the seller’s Conditions of Sale during their negotiations but the buyer was allegedly familiar with
them from past dealings. Pursuant to the agreement, the buyer faxed the seller a
purchase order on June 21, 2006, and the seller sent an order confirmation before
delivery that referred to its Conditions of Sale but did not contain them. The seller
sent the buyer an invoice after shipment that contained its Conditions of Sale,
including a forum selection clause giving Delaware exclusive jurisdiction over any
dispute arising under the agreement.
The court first found that the parties had reached an agreement as to the quantity and price of the soy lecithin Solace sold Hershey in 2006 sufficient to create a
contract under the CISG.45 The contact negotiated by the parties did not contain
a forum selection clause, and there was no evidence that the buyer agreed to a
modification of the contract, beyond receipt of the Conditions of Sale.46 Without
a forum selection clause, the court analyzed whether it had personal jurisdiction
over the defendant, and concluded that it did not and dismissed the complaint.47
In BTC-USA Corp. v. Novacare,48 the court found that when the buyer initialed
the seller’s general conditions of sale adjacent to a forum selection clause, the
parties modified their contact under CISG article 29 and agreed to litigate their
disputes in France. The court therefore found that venue in the U.S. District Court
was improper and dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint.49
The seller Mougeot-Copy (“M-C”), a subsidiary of Novacare, entered into an
oral contract in March 2004 with the buyer, BTC-USA Corp. (“BTC”), to supply
paper. Before filling BTC’s order, M-C required that BTC confirm its agreement
to the seller’s terms on a pro forma invoice, and BTC’s vice president signed the
seller’s invoice and initialed the general conditions of sale adjacent to the forum
selection clause. The issue is whether the parties modified their oral agreement to
include the forum selection clause under CISG article 29.

44. 557 F. Supp. 2d 452, 458 (D. Del. 2008).
45. See id. at 457.
46. See id. at 458. The court relied on the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
in Chateu Des Charmes Wines Ltd. v. Sabate USA Inc., 328 F.3d 528 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1049
(2003). See id. See also infra note 50 and accompanying text.
47. See Solae, 557 F. Supp. 2d at 458–61.
48. No. 07-3998 ADM/JSM, 2008 WL 2465814, at *4–5 (D. Minn. June 16, 2008).
49. See id. at *5.
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The court found that when the buyer initialed the general conditions of sale,
it assented to the forum selection clause.50 Even though the modification was a
material alteration, parties may materially alter their contracts under article 29.51
While the buyer argued that the court should not enforce the forum selection
clause “because doing so would result in hardship and surprise,” the court found
that “hardship and surprise” is relevant under U.C.C. section 2-207,52 but not to
whether parties assent to a modification under the CISG.53
The buyer also argued that the vice president did not read or understand the
forum selection clause, but the court properly acknowledged that failing to read
or understand terms generally does not render contracts avoidable.54 The buyer
contended that the forum selection clause was unreasonable because it was inconvenient and would impose a financial hardship. The court responded that “BTC
has not alleged that it is incapable of litigating in France because of the economic
expense and there is no support for the proposition that financial hardship by
itself warrants a finding that the forum selection clause is unreasonable.”55 The
court ultimately found the forum selection clause enforceable and dismissed the
plaintiff’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3).56

IMPRACTICABILITY
In Hilaturas Miel, S.L. v. Republic of Iraq,57 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York used the commercial impracticability doctrine from the
U.C.C. to interpret the CISG in a case without any American parties. In a dispute
revolving around the inability to perform a contract in light of the threat and commencement of the Iraq War in 2003, the court noted that while the commercial
impracticability doctrine can relieve a seller from performance, it does not require
the buyer to pay for goods it never received.58
The plaintiff Hilaturas Miel, S.L. (“Hilaturas”), is a Spanish company, and the
Republic of Iraq (the “Republic”) is a foreign state under 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).59
In 1995, the U.N. Security Council adopted the Oil for Food Programme (the
“OFFP”), which directed the U.N. Secretary-General to establish an escrow account
to be funded by the sale of Iraqi petroleum and to be used for Iraqi civilian needs.

50. See id. at *4. Compare id., with Chateu Des Charmes Wines Ltd. v. Sabate USA Inc., 328 F.3d
528, 531 (9th Cir.) (holding buyer’s failure to object to forum selection clause in invoices did not
constitute assent to the clause), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1049 (2003).
51. BTC USA, 2008 WL 2465814, at *4.
52. See U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (2002) (providing additional term in acceptance does not become part
of contract between merchants if term materially alters contract); id. cmt. 4 (providing term that results
in surprise or undue hardship materially alters contract for purposes of section 2-207).
53. BTC USA, 2008 WL 2465814, at *4.
54. See id.
55. Id. at *5.
56. See id.
57. 573 F. Supp. 2d 781, 785, 799–80 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
58. See id. at 800.
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (2006).
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Hilaturas was substituted for another party to a contract with the State Company
for Shopping Centers, an Iraqi state-owned enterprise, to provide acrylic yarn in
2002, and the plaintiff made partial shipment and received partial payments from
an account in the United States pursuant to a letter of credit.
In March 2003, the U.N. Secretary-General announced, with the prospect of war
with Iraq looming, that he could not guarantee secure delivery of OFFP shipments.
Part of the yarn supplied by the plaintiff and destined for Iraq never reached Iraq.
On March 17, 2003, the OFFP inspectors were removed from Iraq; those inspectors were necessary to issue the credit-conform documents to allow the plaintiff
to be paid on its letter of credit. Two days later, on March 19, hostilities with Iraq
began. Coalition Forces invaded Baghdad on April 9, 2003, state-owned enterprises were looted, and the Government of Iraq soon ceased to exist. In June 2004,
the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution providing for the interim government of Iraq to assume responsibility for all obligations relating to the OFFP.
The parties do not dispute that the CISG governs the contract at issue, which the
plaintiff alleges that the Republic breached in not performing its obligation to pay
for the goods (that it never received) under the OFFP contract.
The court first explained that the Republic was not responsible for performance
under CISG article 79.60 Under that article, “ ‘[a] party is not liable for failure to
perform on any of his obligations if he proves that the failure was due to an impediment beyond his control and that he could not reasonably be expected to have
taken the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract or
to have avoided or overcome it.’ ”61 Because Iraqi inspectors were withdrawn, the
plaintiff could neither deliver its goods nor obtain credit-conform documents, the
latter of which was a condition precedent to payment on the letter of credit and
an express requirement of the contract.62
While the plaintiff alleged that the Republic had to accept alternative performance once it became clear that the credit-conform documents could not be obtained, the court stated it was unaware of any such duty.63 While the plaintiff cited
CISG article 54, the court noted that article 54 does not address whether the buyer
is required to accept alternative performance when the seller cannot perform its
obligations under a contract, but rather, it discusses the buyer’s performance.64
The court next noted that CISG article 46(2) addresses substitute goods and not
substitute performance, but could still be used to determine the appropriate rule
for substitute performance because the CISG is silent on this issue.65 Article 46(2)
states, “ ‘If the goods do not conform with the contract, the buyer may require delivery of substitute goods only if the lack of conformity constitutes a fundamental
breach of contract and a request for substitute goods is made either in conjunc-

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See Hilaturas, 781 F. Supp. 2d at 798.
Id. (quoting CISG, supra note 2, art. 79(1)).
See id. at 799–800.
See id. at 799.
See id.
See id.
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tion with notice given under article 39 or within a reasonable time thereafter.’ ”66
Further, as did the court in Macromex SRL v. Global International, Inc.,67 the court
looked at U.C.C. section 2-614 to determine the extent to which substitute performance should be required under the CISG.68 The court also found that the concept of “fundamental breach” under the CISG is comparable to terms that go to
the “essence of the agreement” under official comment 1 to U.C.C. section 2-614;
thus, section 2-614 could be used to address the issue of substitute performance
under the CISG.69
The court concluded that the plaintiff “failed to allege that it ever tendered reasonable substitute performance, nor does [i]t describe any method of substitute
performance that was available.”70 Further, inspection in Iraq was an “essential
term” of the plaintiff’s contract. While the plaintiff argued that the Republic had
the obligation to provide substitute performance under the contract, that “turn[ed]
the doctrine of impossibility on its head,” because it was the plaintiff and not the
Republic that could not perform because of the war and the withdrawal of the
inspectors.71 The court was correct in not requiring the Republic to pay for goods
that were never delivered because of circumstances unforeseen by and outside the
control of the contracting parties.

NOTICE OF NON-CONFORMITY
In Sky Cast, Inc. v. Global Direct Distribution, LLC,72 the court denied motions of
both the buyer and seller for summary judgment on the buyer’s counterclaims for
breach of contract,73 but found that the buyer gave timely notice of its breach of
contract counterclaim under CISG article 39.
For almost three years prior to the lawsuit, Sky Cast, a Canadian manufacturer
of concrete light poles, and Global, an American buyer of these light poles for
construction projects in the United States, had established a course of dealing between them. On April 20, 2006, consistent with the pattern of performance that
had arisen between the two parties, Global sent a purchase order to Sky Cast, and
despite some problems with the production of the light poles and the timing of
deliveries, Sky Cast ultimately shipped the light poles and Global accepted them.
Sky Cast sued Global for breach of contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation,
and unjust enrichment, and Global filed a breach of contract counterclaim against

66. Id. (quoting CISG, supra note 2, art. 46(2)).
67. No. 08 Civ. 114 (SAS), 2008 WL 1752530 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2008). For more on this case, see
infra notes 81–85 and accompanying text.
68. See Hilaturas, 781 F. Supp. 2d at 800.
69. See id. (citing U.C.C. § 2-614 cmt. 1(2002)).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 65 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 589, 595–96 (E.D. Ky. 2008).
73. The court did find the seller was entitled to summary judgment on its breach of contract claim
seeking payment for unpaid goods accepted under the contract. Id. at 594. The only issue remaining was the amount of damages to which the seller was entitled, which required consideration of the
buyer’s counterclaim for breach of contract due to delay in shipment.
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Sky Cast for the damages it suffered from the delays in delivery. Sky Cast argued
that U.C.C. section 2-60774 precluded Global from recovering on its counterclaim
as the buyer did not give notice within a reasonable time after the purported
breach.
The court found that because the CISG and not the U.C.C. governed the transaction between the parties, the applicable provision was CISG article 39.75 The
court quoted CISG article 39:
(1) The buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods if he does
not give notice to the seller specifying the nature of the lack of conformity within a
reasonable time after he has discovered it or ought to have discovered it.
(2) In any event, the buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods
if he does not give notice thereof at the latest within a period of two years from the
date on which the goods were actually handed over to the buyer, unless this timelimit is inconsistent with a contractual period of guarantee.76

The court found that, in essence, the non-conformity that Global alleged was a
delay in the shipments. The court construed CISG article 39 to permit Global a
full two years to notify Sky Cast that the goods were non-conforming.77 In other
words, the court cast aside what seemed to be, at least as stated in CISG article 39,
a “reasonable time” requirement with a cap of two years78 in favor of a two-year
statute of limitations.79 Thus, according to this erroneous construction, two years
is the minimum (and maximum) time allotted under the CISG, and no matter
what the product or the defect is, the buyer has two years to inform the seller of
the non-conformity. In this case, the court found that because it was indisputable
that Global filed its counterclaim within two years from the time of the purported
breach by Sky Cast, it had given Sky Cast adequate notice.80

REMEDIES
LOST PROFITS
In Macromex SRL v. Globex International, Inc.,81 the court found that lost profits
calculated under CISG article 74 should be based on the market value of the
goods at their intended place of sale. Globex, an American company, sells food
products to foreign countries. Globex contracted to sell Macromex, a Romanian
company, 112 containers of chicken parts and deliver them to Romania. The CISG
governed the contract.

74. See U.C.C. § 2-607 (2002) (requiring buyer to give notice within reasonable time from when
buyer discovered or should have discovered seller’s breach or lose all remedy for that breach).
75. See Sky Cast, 655 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 595.
76. Id. (quoting CISG, supra note 2, at. 39).
77. Id.
78. CISG, supra note 2, art. 39(1).
79. See Sky Cast, 655 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 595.
80. See id.
81. No. 08 Civ. 114 (SAS), 2008 WL 1752530, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2008).
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The contract required that Globex make final shipment by May 29, 2006; however, by June 2, 2006, Globex had failed to ship sixty-two of the containers. On
June 2, 2006, the Romanian government declared that, as of June 7, 2006, no
chicken could be imported into the country unless it was certified by that later
date. Between June 2 and June 7, Globex shipped twenty of the remaining sixtytwo containers that it had contracted to sell. As of June 7, the remaining forty-two
containers could not be shipped to Romania because Globex had failed to satisfy
the certification requirement. Macromex brought arbitration proceedings against
Globex for breach of contract and won.
In court challenging the arbitral award, Globex argued that damages calculated
under CISG article 74 should not reflect the market price of chicken in Romania, but rather reflect the price in Georgia (where Macromex proposed that Globex
ship the chickens in light of the impossibility of performing in Romania). “Globex
reason[ed] that if it breached, it did so by failing to complete the substituted performance (shipping to Georgia), not by failing to ship to Romania, which was
impossible.”82 Because the arbitrator rejected Globex’s force majeure defense (finding
that Globex could have provided substitute performance and shipped to Macromex
in Georgia),83 the contract was breached and article 74 applied.84 However, under
CISG article 74, lost profits are calculated as the amount foreseeable at the time the
contract is executed, and therefore the arbitrator correctly found that they should
be based on the market value of chickens in Romania at the time of performance.85

PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
Two courts in 2008 reached opposite results as to whether a party could earn
prejudgment interest running from the time of an arbitral confirmation to a judgment, an issue on which the CISG is silent. In Guang Dong Light Headgear Factory
Co., Ltd. v. ACI International, Inc.,86 the court, citing to a U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York case,87 found that not awarding prejudgment interest from the time of an arbitral award would impede U.S. policy of favoring arbitration in international commerce, which is a purpose of the CISG to promote.
In 2003, Chinese plaintiff Guang Dong brought an action against American defendant ACI, asking the court to confirm and enforce an arbitration award made

82. Id.
83. See id. at *2. The court relied on U.C.C. section 2-614 in interpreting the CISG. See id. at *3–4
(citing U.C.C. § 2-614 (2002)). The court distinguished between “surmountable impediments,” in
which case a seller has to provide substitute performance if reasonable, and “insurmountable impediments,” in which case performance can be excused without substitution. See id. at *4. Macromex was
closer to the first case, so the court found that the seller was obligated to provide delivery to the buyer
at another port when delivery at the port specified in the contract became impracticable. See id.
84. See id. at *4.
85. See id. at *5. See also CISG, supra note 2, art. 74 (providing that damages may not exceed loss
breaching party ought to have foreseen at the time the contract was formed).
86. No. 03-4165-JAR, 2008 WL 1924948, at *3 (D. Kan. Apr. 28, 2008).
87. Sarhank Group v. Oracle Corp., No. 01 Civ. 1285 (DAB), 2004 WL 324881, at *2 (Feb. 19,
2004), vacated, 404 F.3d 657 (2d Cir. 2005).
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by the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission. In an
amended complaint filed on August 1, 2006, Guang Dong requested prejudgment
interest. The parties tried ACI’s counterclaims, and they agreed to offset Guang
Dong’s liability on the counterclaims by the amount of the arbitral award but
were in dispute over whether interest accruing on that arbitral award should be
included in the offset.
The court first found that the plaintiff did not waive the right to receive prejudgment interest by not requesting it in its pretrial order.88 As to whether the plaintiff
should receive prejudgment interest, the court noted that the arbitral award itself
provided Guang Dong interest under CISG article 78, which reads, “ ‘[I]f a party
fails to pay the price or any other sum that is in arrears, the other party is entitled
to interest on it, without prejudice to any claim for damages recoverable under
article 74.’ ”89 The court found that “failing to award prejudgment interest would
impede the purpose of the CISG, which is to further the federal policy of favoring arbitration as a means to resolve disputes by promoting the enforcement of
arbitral agreements in international commerce.”90
Last, the court had to decide what interest rate to apply. The CISG itself is
silent on the rate of interest to be applied;91 the plaintiff wanted the interest rate
under state law consistent with the rule for domestic arbitration awards, while
ACI wanted the federal postjudgment interest rate. The court chose the federal
rate because it believed the higher state rate would overcompensate the plaintiff,
reward the plaintiff for its delay from incomplete discovery responses, and undermine the goal of certainty and stability in international transactions.92
In Zhejiang Shaoxing Yongli Printing & Dyeing Co., Ltd. v. Microflock Textile Group
Corp.,93 the court reached the opposite result under the CISG and refused to
award any prejudgment interest arising from an arbitral award. The court agreed
with the Guang Dong court that the CISG is silent on this question, but found that
law in the forum state (Florida), rather than federal substantive law, controlled,
and that the plaintiff was not entitled to prejudgment interest under Florida law.94
The court cited AIG Baker Sterling Heights, LLC v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc.,95 an
Eleventh Circuit case, for the proposition that state law applies when determining the availability of prejudgment interest.96 What the court in Zhejiang Shaoxing

88. See Guang Dong, 2008 WL 1924949, at *3 (noting authority split on whether failure to request
prejudgment interest in pretrial order constituted waiver).
89. Id. (quoting CISG, supra note 2, art. 78 (alteration in original)).
90. Id.
91. Id. at *4.
92. See id. The court’s decision is consistent with the two other U.S. decisions on the appropriate rate for prejudgment interest on a foreign arbitration award. See Sarhank Group v. Oracle Corp.,
No. 01 Civ. 1285 (DAB), 2004 WL 324881, at *2 (Feb. 19, 2004), vacated, 404 F.3d 657 (2d Cir.
2005); P.M.I. Trading Ltd. v. Farstad Oil, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 7120 (RLC), 2001 WL 38282, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2001).
93. No. 06-22608-CIV, 2008 WL 2098062, at *5 (S.D. Fla. May 19, 2008).
94. See id.
95. 508 F.3d 995, 1001–02 (11th Cir. 2007).
96. Zhejiang Shaoxing, 2008 WL 2098062, at *5.
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ignores, however, is the statement of the AIG Baker court: “An exception to this
general rule exists when affirmative countervailing federal interests are at stake
that warrant application of federal law.”97 The Zhejiang court did not consider
countervailing federal interests. Indeed, the court’s approach is at odds with the
purpose of the CISG as it subjects plaintiffs in international arbitrations to potentially conflicting state rules on prejudgment interest rather than to a uniform
approach that federal law would provide.

97. See AIG Baker, 508 F.3d at 1001–02 (internal quotation marks omitted).

